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This thesis attempts to determine if an international
comparison of nominal military wages can provide insight into
the problem of retaining mid-career officers, noncommissioned
officers, and petty officers in the U.S. military.
The analysis indicates that United States' noncommissioned
officers and petty officers are being compensated relatively
less than their foreign counterparts but this does not hold
for officers. However, because other occupational choice
factors are interrelated with compensation, monetary compensa-
tion is not the only determinant affecting retention. The
relatively higher U.S. officer compensation levels may be
insufficient to offset the possibly greater perceived
disutility associated with U.S. military service, or U.S.
officers may have better opportunities in the civilian sector
than their foreign counterparts. The relative cost-effective-
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This study examines the problem of retention of mid-
career officers, noncommissioned officers, and petty officers
in the U.S. military. It focuses on one aspect of the prob-
lem pay. Several nationally acclaimed articles have
recently been published, bringing public attention to the
monetary plight of this category of military personnel as
compared to their counterparts in the private sector [1, 2,
3 ]
.
This study focuses on another method of examining the
problem. Specifically, it attempts to determine if an
international comparison of nominal wages of military per-
sonnel reveals that the United States' relatively greater
manpower problems might result from lower compensation levels,
relatively speaking, than observed in other nations.
A. THE RETENTION PROBLEM
The U.S. Army is short 7,000 noncommissioned officers —
most of them in infantry, artillery, and armor-combat
specialties. The Navy needs20,000 petty officers, and
15,000 of the unfilled jobs are sea billets - at a time
when the ships of the Sixth and Seventh fleets are spend-
ing 20 to 25 percent more time at sea; worse still, the
Navy will soon need 10,000 more petty officers to staff
the 50 to 60 new ships that will enter the fleet by 1985.
Even the glamorous Air Force is having- trouble retaining
pilots, computer specialists and other skilled men and
women who are leaving for jobs in the private sector.
Between 1975 and 1979, third hitch re-enlistments
plummeted by 20 percent [3:52].
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The statistics quoted above paint a dismal picture of the
plight of the alleged "backbone" of the armed services, the
mid-career noncommissioned officers CNCOs) and petty officers.
Mid-career officer ranks have been hit hard as well. The
Department of Defense is faced with retention rates for
pilots in the Navy and Air Force that are less than half the
desired number; the Navy is having great difficulty in
retaining adequate numbers of nuclear submarine and surface
warfare officers; and the Air Force cannot keep the
necessary number of engineers and navigators [1]. These
departing officers, NCOs,and petty officers are a mainstay
in the services, providing the skills and experience necessary
to operate highly technical equipment and also the main ingre-
dient for successful military opertions, namely leadership.
These shortages are based upon peacetime requirements, not
the even more critical wartime levels.
The peacetime active force problem is not one of raw
numbers. As of March, 1980, the four services had 2,032,000
men and women volunteers in uniform, 9 6% of objective [2]
.
The problem for the armed services is retention of the
lieutenants, captains, majors, NCOs, and petty officers to
operate and maintain complex equipment as well as train and
lead the new enlistees and junior officers.
B. OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE: A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
Occupational choice, in economic terms, has to do with
the determination of why some occupations provide higher
12
y
earnings than others and what determines the allocation of
time to different occupations [4]. To put it simply, why do
people choose one particular occupation over another?
In economics, the law of supply says that the quantity
supplied of a product usually varies directly with its price,
assuming that all other things remain the same [5] . In dis-
cussing the supply of career military personnel, the "other
things" that may have an influence in determining supply are
nonpecuniary factors such as job stability, risk, separation,
length of workday, job satisfaction, and quality of non-
careerists. Price would take the form of wages received}
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the points to be made.
Figure 1 illustrates, other things remaining the same,
how retention is related to direct compensation. As direct
compensation changes from level C to C, to C-, there is a
corresponding movement up and down the supply curve, signify-
ing an increase or decrease in the quantity supplied.
Figure 2 illustrates, direct compensation remaining con-
stant at level C , how changes in other factors affect the
location of the supply curve, and hence, retention. Assume
Q to be the normal state. If job satisfaction, for
o
example, is perceived as increasing, the supply curve may
shift to the right, providing an increase in supply to C^.
If job satisfaction is perceived as decreasing, then- the
supply curve may shift to the left, causing a decrease in
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of the supply curve, changes in the slope, or wage elasticity,
of the curve, i.e, the responsiveness of retention to a
change in direct compensation.
"Supply of retained careerists, in this study, is a
function of direct compensation, stability, risk, separa-
tion, length of workday, job satisfaction, and recruit defi-
ciencies. All but direct compensation will shift the supply
curve, i.e., determine how many are available at any/all
compensation level (s).
Wage rates vary from occupation to occupation and also
provide various levels of satisfaction (utility) to the
worker. Thus, an individual will put up with uncomfortable
conditions if provided a relatively high salary which per-
mits him to obtain material goods to offset the disutility
endured on the job. In contrast, an individual may be will-
ing to work for a fairly low wage, if offset with job satis-
faction, e.g., a social worker [6].
Investment in training must also be considered in a
discussion of occupational choice [7] . Some occupations
require large investments in training while others require
much smaller investments. Mansfield uses the example of a
physicist who must spend about eight years in undergraduate
and graduate training. Each year training expenses are
incurred for books, tuition, and living, and he foregoes the
income that he would make if he were to work rather than go
15

to school. The physicist is making an investment by incurring
these expenses and foregoing the income he could be re-
ceiving instead of studying. To make a return on his invest-
ment, the difference in wages or in utility between what he
makes as a physicist and what he would have made without this
training must be sufficient to make up for the physicist's
investment in the extra training.
(From the above it can be seen that an individual, in
choosing an occupation or changing from one occupation to
another, is influenced by a variety of factors. To under-
stand why so many officers, NCOs and petty officers are
leaving the U.S. military establishment, a discussion of some
factors which can affect an individual's decision to remain in
or leave the service is required.
1. Nonpecuniary Determinants
The serviceman may see alternatives or features of
employment outside the military which are very attractive or
unattractive to him, causing him to remain in or depart
military service.
a. Stability
With the possible exception of the Soviet Union,
the United States has more military personnel, spread over
a wider area of the world, than any other country. U.S.
military personnel are extremely mobile, shuttling from one
military installation to another and rotating between Europe
and Asia. This rather continuous reassignment policy may be
16

perceived as a disruption of family life, may force the
family to live in areas which, are not appealing in terms of
ethnic, social, political, geographic, or economic features.
Consequently, "disutility" may cause an individual to trans-
fer to an occupation which removes the source of disruption.
b. Risk
Military service, because of its commitment to
"protect and defend the government of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic" (phrase from Oath
of Enlistment)
, does contain an element of risk. In the
event of war, there is always the possibility that a soldier
may be killed, wounded or captured. Therefore, civilian jobs
may look relatively more attractive.
c. Separation and Length of Workday
The idea of repeated, lengthy separation from
family and friends is not appealing to most servicemen. For
example, the USS Nimitz recently returned to her homeport
after a nine-month cruise, including 144 consecutive days at
sea [2], With the shortages of officers and petty officers
to man Navy ships, Navy personnel most often face such cruises
on a "back to back" basis, with little time ashore with their
families. Army, Air Force, and Marine personnel often are
assigned to tours of duty in countries such as Korea and
Japan (Okinawa) for up to a year without being accompanied by
their families. Those remaining at stateside installations
17

are often expected to work in excess of 4Q hours per week to
accomplish their mission. No matter, the serviceman often
finds himelf isolated from family and friends.
d. Job Satisfaction
Budget constraints and soaring fuel costs have
severely limited the quality and quantity of training and
work that can be accomplished by the services. For example,
pilots unable to fly the required number of hours needed to
maintain proficiency as well as to satisfy their love of
flying. Maintenance specialists lack spare parts to prop-
erly service and maintain equipment, or equipment on hand
is so old it is impossible to maintain properly [2].
e. Recruit Deficiencies
In recent years there has been a marked decrease
in the number of recruits entering the service with some
college experience, as well as a drastic drop in recruits
in the highest mental category, and an accompanying increase
in the number of recruits in the lower mental categories [2].
Career soldiers and sailors find it is difficult or impossible
to train lower quality recruits to satisfactorily handle the
increasingly complex equipment. Once trained, many question
the ability of some recruits to retain their skills long
enough to utilize them on the job. This general distrust of




"Old-line Army men complain that the system has
been 'gentled 1 to make life easier for volunteers" [3], The
gist of the complaint is that when the today's enlisted
soldiers encounter a tough situation they will not be able to
"hack it".
2. Direct and Indirect Compensation
The occupational choice factors discussed above are
largely nonpecuniary in nature. However, all have been
cited at various times by officers, noncommissioned officers
and petty officers as reasons for leaving military service.
Economic theory says that if there is a shortage of labor
in a given category then wage rates will rise in order to
attract and retain workers significantly to offset job dis-
advantages. This being the case, it is necessary to discuss
compensation as a factor in occupational choice. Direct
compensation, indirect (supplemental) compensation, and
fringe benefits are the three basic categories of compensa-
tion [6]. A complete list of U.S. compensation is found in
Table I.
Direct compensation is the payment for the perfor-
mance of an individual based on the amount of time worked
(hours, weeks, months, or years) . In the U.S. military,
direct compensation is generally considered to include basic
pay, quarters and subsistence allowances (cash and in kind)
,
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direct compensation because neither quarters nor subsistence
allowances are taxable. The magnitude of the tax advantage
is equivalent to the amount of additional income required to
ensure the same take-home pay if the allowances were taxable
[8]. Other forms of direct compensation include special
and premium pays such as bonuses, proficiency pay, flight pay,
parachute jumping pay, demolition pay, and diving pay.
Indirect compensation includes actual payments the
individual is entitled to by law (entitlements) and other
non-cash quantifiable benefits. Entitlements include family
separation allowance, clothing allowance and dislocation
allowance. Non-cash quantifiable compensation includes
commissary and exchange benefits, medical care, retirement
pay and many others.
Fringe benefits include benefits for which no monetary
payment or cost is made or incurred. They include unlimited
sick leave, weekend passes, free legal services, and space
available travel on military aircraft.
When reviewing compensation as a factor in occupa-
tional choice, the soldier (worker) also considers nominal
income and real income. Nominal income consists of the actual
amount of money received for work done. Real income is the
purchasing power of money income as measured by the quantity
of goods and services it can buy. Money income may be quite
different from real income, since real income is determined
21

not only by money income but also by the general price level.
And most importantly, it is the perceived value of indirect
pay and fringe benefits which has direct bearing on an
individual's occupational choice.
Looked at in total, military compensation components
appear to cover a rather broad spectrum of occupational
categories, providing extra pay for those who perform
hazardous, arduous duties, those who are separated from their
families, and a myriad of other types of compensation. Yet
career officers, NCOs and petty officers are still leaving.
An attempt is being made to compensate for the disadvantages
of military service and attract and retain workers in
accordance with the economic model, but still, "money is at
the root of the manpower problem in all three services.
Adjusted for inflation, the income of armed forces personnel
has dropped up to 20 percent since 1972. The discrepancy
is worse where it hurts the most: in the 25 to 34 year old
group that contains precisely the trained personnel the ser-
vices need most desperately to retain [3:52}."
pThe amount of pay is clearly a major issuej While
departing personnel often mention non-monetary factors as
reasons for leaving, virtually all cite lack of pay as a
major factor. Under current law military pay is presumably
set according to the so-called comparability principle,
originally intended to keep Federal pay (military and
22

civilian) competitive with the civilian sector. The problem
is that military pay is not in fact linked directly with pri-
vate sector wages and salaries, but is tied through a set
linkages to the General Service system. Thus, while attempt-
ing to compete within the civilian marketplace for manpower,
built-in limitations in the military pay system fail to over-
come the negative occupational factors with enough dollars
to retain required personnel [9].
Congress and President Carter recently passed and
approved an 11.7 percent pay raise for military personnel and
a 9.1 percent raise for civilian personnel. While these
raises constitute a move in the right direction, the services
are still playing "catch up" to 1972 levels, and there is a
long way to go before true comparability is reached [10] . In
the meantime it seems likely that highly trained personnel
will continue to exercise their option to look for compensa-
tion commensurate with the training and education they have
received through their military association.
C. THE STUDY OBJECTIVE
It is apparent from the literature that the pay of these
departing personnel is at least not perceived as commensurate
with what they can receive in the civilian sector. Examples
commonly used are the Navy chief petty officer, E7, with 17
years of service who makes the same salary as a janitor on
union scale and puts in twice as many hours; or the Navy
captain who earns $43,218 annually, including allowances for
23

food and quarters but his counterpart, a Merchant Marine
Master with his customary overtime can make $66,450 [1, 2],
The lack of comparability to the civilian sector in the United
States military has been established [1, 2, 3, 11].
Do U.S. allies have retention problems? There is little
evidence suggesting that there are as serious military man-
power shortages in other industrialized nations. However,
shortages do exist in certain functions. For example, a
recent article in the Norwegian FORSVARETS FORUM indicated
that Norway is short about 6 pilots, particularly career
pilots. The pilot retention problem is explained by the
swings in demand for pilots by the Scandinavian Airline
System (SAS) . When SAS demand is high, military pilots are
lost to higher wages and an extended lifetime of flying with
SAS [11]. Military pilots only fly until the age of 40-45
and then must resign themselves to administrative duties and
forego supplementary flight pay. Defense officials in the
Federal Republic of Germany have stated that the German
military suffers some retention problems in technical areas,
but apparently not anywhere near the magnitude of the U.S.
problem [11]. In 1979, the United Kingdom authorized two
military pay raises, the first 24.2 percent, the second 9
percent. In April 19 80, the Pay Review Revision Board
authorized another increase ranging from 14.5 to 20 percent
[12] . The British belief is that "unless there is a con-
tinuing assurance that armed forces pay will be kept broadly
24

in line with pay in civilian life at equivalent levels, the
Services' ability to recruit and in particular, to retain
will once again be put in jeopardy [13:1]." This is an indi-
cation that United Kingdom forces may have experienced reten-
tion problems.
Apparently Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom do not share the
United States* serious career military personnel retention
problem. The obvious question is "Why?" It has been shown
that pay is a large factor in the U.S. retention problem. Are
the armed forces of the countries mentioned relatively better
paid than U.S. forces? Do they receive higher absolute pay
in dollar equivalents? Are they relatively better off than
the average typical worker compared to their U.S. counterparts?
The objective of this study is to determine if an inter-
national comparison of nominal wages of military personnel,
indicate that the United States' relatively greater manpower
problems may at least in part result from the U.S. military
being compensated less, relatively speaking, than their foreign
counterparts
.
D. SCOPE OF STUDY
This thesis limits itself to deal only with an inter-
national comparison of wages. It is recognized that this may
constitute but one part of the retention problem in the United
States military. Even though interrelated, an analysis of
other occupational choice factors is seen as outside the
25

scope of this study as they are worthy of separate thesis
topics.
However, even this apparently limited scope is not simple.
The complications of international pay comparisons will be
addressed in Chapter II. Assumptions, methodology, and
analysis will be detailed in Chapter III. Chapter IV will
outline conclusions that can be made regarding the U.S. renten-
tion problem after analyzing just one variable affecting
occupational choice as well as any recommendations regarding
future studies in this area.
26

II. AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
This thesis compares the nominal wages of military per-
sonnel in Canada, Denmark , France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Shortly after beginning this project, it was realized that a
myriad of problems exist which can stifle and/or affect the
validity of the comparison. These problems do not have to
be addressed directly but they must be mentioned so that any
derived conclusions are considered in proper perspective.
This chapter contains a brief review of the various complica-
tions which can affect an international comparison.
A. COMPLICATING ISSUES
1. Cost of Living Variations
The idea that the cost of living varies from state
to state and from country to country has become an accepted
fact. The cost of living, and therefore real salary levels,
are significantly affected by geographical location, popula-
tion, tax policies, social welfare, availability of national
health insurance, and compensation policies and methods.
The concepts of nominal income and real income must be re-
ferred to again. For example, a person living in Washington,
D.C. and another person living in Manhattan, Kansas, may
have identical nominal incomes, yet the cost of living in
27

Kansas is lower than in Washington, D.C. The Kansan has a
much higher real income. The same idea can be applied to
international comparisons. An officer in Canada may earn
the equivalent of $20,000 annually while his counterpart in
the Federal Republic of Germany earns only $12,000. Because
of cost of living variations, it is conceivable that the
German officer may have the higher real income. Exchange
rates were used to convert the various national wages to
dollars. However, exchange rates rarely, if ever, fully
reflect price variations or the purchasing power of income.
Therefore, this study was unable to correct for international
price variations, and this limitation should be kept in mind
when interpreting the data.
2. Mixed Versus All-Volunteer Procurement Systems
Only three of the countries being compared, Canada,
the United Kingdom, and the United States, rely solely on
volunteers for their armed forces. The others, Denmark,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Norway rely on
a conscription or "draft" system to varying degrees in order
to maintain military manpower strengths. While conscription
countries need not be concerned about compensation as a
factor for attracting personnel to the military initially,
they do have to be concerned about attracting and retaining
at least a cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers.
In that respect all countries are alike. However, a fairly
28

recent comment by Janowitz regarding the shift to an all-
volunteer concept in the U.S. may be applicable:
From the point of view of the contemporary military, the
all-volunteer concept has eliminated the initially re-
luctant conscript who decided while in service to make
the military a career. This development may point up a
crucial loss in dedicated personnel [14:10]."
The all-volunteer concept thus narrows the base from
which career soldiers as well as officers are drawn, since
conscription also motivates individuals who ordinarily would
not consider military service to pursue a commission and
possibly a career. Dismissing conscript career possibilities
it is also true that, "assuming that the conscripts get an
overall favorable impression of the military, the high partic-
ipating rate that conscription can provide fosters necessary
understanding of and support for the military [15:7]." This
aspect of conscriptive service could have positive or negative
impact on wages for the career military, depending on the
experience of each individual. Much of this discussion harks
back to the non-monetary factors of occupational choice which
are not to be considered here. Nonetheless, it emphasizes
a possible effect or distortion which could occur when com-
paring military incomes under such different systems of pro-
curement as the all-volunteer and conscription concepts.
3 . Unique Features of the Various Compensation Systems
Each country has the same basic compensation compo-
nents, that is, direct compensation, indirect compensation,
29

and fringe benefits. It could be argued that the systems of
each are pretty much the same, make an assumption to that
effect, and dismiss the point. However, analysis of the data
received in developing this study reveals that each country's
compensation system has at least some unique features which
set it apart from that of the United States. Data came from
various sources
,
and in the case of some countries, it is cer-
tain that the information is not complete, nor can the
accuracy of all the data be confirmed. Still it is apparent
that there are differences which should be noted and possibly
considered as the analysis develops in the following chapters.
To avoid redundancy, only those features which are different
from the U.S. compensation system will be mentioned.
a. Canada
Pay for Canadian military personnel is based on
a salary system linked to Public Service employee salaries.
However, the fact that military service and public service
jobs are not directly comparable or perfectly interchangeable
is recognized through the inclusion of an "x" factor in
military salaries. The "x" factor is included to acknowledge
the disutilities of military service to which all members
are exposed. Examples of disutilities include risk, separa-
tion, stability, and job satisfaction. Presently the "x"
factor is four percent [16].
30

Officers and enlisted ranks pay scales are sub-
divided into incentive pay categories to recognize increased
effectiveness as time in rank increases. These within grade
increases are not automatic, but are paid at the discretion
of the servicemember * s commanding officer [17].
Servicemen required to move to a new duty station
because of official orders are reimbursed to the extent that
they neither gain nor lose money. Transportation costs as
well as all accomodation costs are reimbursed. This includes
interim lodging and meals at either or both ends of the
journey for the period the family is separated from furniture
and effects. If a servicemember is required to buy or sell a
house as a result of an official move, real estate costs and
legal fees are reimbursed [16].
The Canadian retirement program is contributory,
with 7.5 percent of pay deducted each pay period. Upon
retirement or departure from active service, the service-
member can choose an immediate annuity, a deferred annuity,
or a return of contributions with interest at four percent,
depending on years of active service [18].
b. Denmark
The Danish military is "functionally organized."
The American term is unionized. Within the Ministry of
Defense, a separate staff provides a point of contact with
the military unions. The Chief of Cooperation deals with
52 different unions. This plethora of organizations includes
31

unions for general officers, other officers, NCOs, doctors,
nurses, and pilots. Some of the benefits claimed include
premium pay for overtime Cmore than 40 hours per week)
,
weekend or holiday duty, a union dues checkoff system, union
activities permitted during duty hours and union newspapers
and magazines are permitted. There are no restrictions on
hair or beard style.
Military pay negotiations parallel civilian pay
negotiations every 1-2 years, and the military receives bene-
fits comparable to those achieved in the public sector [19]
.
Through negotiation it has been possible to obtain a selective
wage system that rewards special qualifications. In the
Danish armed forces no "employee" can be discharged without
previous consultation with the appropriate functional organi-
zation [20] . Retirement programs also vary from one
functional organization to another [20, 21]
.
c. France
French military personnel have a contributory
retirement system with six percent of base pay retained by
the government. A commissioned officer may request retire-
ment after 25 years of active duty. A noncommissioned officer
may do so after 15 years of active duty. In addition to
retirement pension, each retiree receives an additional
allowance for raising three or more children over the age of
16. During their years of active duty, military personnel
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receive a family pay supplement corresponding to the number of
children they have. Allowances are also paid for teaching,
participation in the work of various juries and examining
boards, and special police functions [22, 23]. There is no
indication that French military pay scales are tied to the pri-
vate or public sector.
d. Federal Republic of Germany
The military basic pay scale is the same as that
for Civil Service employees. Also included is a tax-free
children's allowance [24]. All military personnel who are
required to work on Sundays, legal holidays and Saturdays
after 1300, and between 2000 and 0600 on other days are paid
overtime pay. German military personnel receive a special
Christmas bonus, a 13th full month's pay [17].
The retirement system in noncontributory and
entitlement to retirement pay is based on length of service,
age, and grade. Officers and enlisted personnel are selected
for career status between the 2d and 15th year of service.
Once career status is granted, the servicemember has a life-
time contract which includes full pension eligibility. No
voluntary retirement is permitted; a member must serve to
the mandatory retirement age for the grade attained.
Examples of mandatory retirement ceilings are: all enlisted
grades and officers through captain, age 52; major, age 54;
and lieutenant colonel, age 56 [17,25].
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Functional organizations are active but they do
not participate and bargain in the pay adjustment process
[24].
e . Norway
Military pay is linked to the civil service salary
scale; however, this scale is supplemented by negotiated
recognition of the difference between civil and military ser-
vice. Other allowances are paid for overtime, unusual working
hours, and extra dirty work [26].
All Norwegians put 2.4% of their lifetime salary
into a national social services fund. The military have a
separate retirement system from the state employees. Service-
members can retire at age 60 with 66 2/3 percent of base pay
and allowances. At age 65, they can also collect a certain
percent from the general national fund as well. The services
deal directly with the Ministry of Defense on wages, with no
intervention by functional organizations [26].
All Norwegians are covered by national health
care programs.
f. United Kingdom
The pay system is a military salary concept tied
to the private sector providing the comparable salaries for




In addition, a military "x" factor is paid all
personnel to recognize the uniqueness of military service.
The present rates are 10 percent for men and 5 percent for
women. The British retirement system is non-contributory.
There is a policy for the refund of expenses associated with
the purchase or sale of property due to official orders [17].
g. Conclusions
Of the features mentioned previously, the
"x" factor, the overtime policies of Denmark, Germany and
Norway, and salaries tied to public service vice the private
sector are probably most important.
Canada and the United Kingdom use the "x" factor
to recognize the disutilities of service to which all ser-
vice members are exposed. Factors considered include some
of the same or similar occupational choice factors discussed
in Chapter One. Namely, acceptance of a strict code of
discipline, the inherent risk in the event of war, liability
for service in any part of the world, and a requirement, if
necessary, to work long hours without pay. Norway
apparently recognizes these factors as well with its military
allowance and, Norwegian volunteers in United Nations' forces
receive extra pay as well as a tax advantage. The point is
that Canada, Norway, and the United Kingdom directly acknowl-
edge these occupational choice factors, the United States
does so indirectly with separation pay, hostile fire pay, and
dislocation allowance, for example.
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The overtime policies of Denmark, Germany, and
Norway are also an important consideration. Whether the
overtime is taken in the form of extra leisure time or in
monetary supplements, pay per workhour increases. Service-
members in these countries know that extra hours of duty will
be rewarded. In the United States and France, more hours
on the job simply mean less leisure time. There is no monetary
or alternate leisure reward. Canada and the United Kingdom
officially recognize extra hours worked with the "x" factor,
although a speculator may be correct in surmising that the
average servicemember forgets all about "x" factor when re-
quired to work extra hours. At any rate, it would appear that
overtime compensation may be a significant factor in occupa-
tional choice for servicemembers in those countries that have
the policy.
Military salaries in Canada, Denmark, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and Norway are tied directly to public
service salaries. In these countries, servicemembers know
that they can move with relative ease from the military sec-
tor to public service, with little, if any, loss of pay and
benefits. Defense personnel may feel that if they ever grow
to dislike military life, there will be no great loss in
transferring to public service. The Federal Republic of
Germany may be an exception, with its "career" retirement




4. Differences in Mission and Attitudes
Except for Canada, none of the countries included
in this study has a comparable national territory as large
as the United States to protect. Further, because of
extensive defense commitments/treaties, the United States
has an image as the world's peacekeeper to maintain. The
United Kingdom and France also have global military obliga-
tions, but not to the extent of U.S. forces. These factors
and their effects on the past, present, and future must be
considered as military pay is analyzed.
a. Reassignments
It is possible for military personnel in Denmark,
Norway, and the Federal Republic of Germany to be reassigned
several times without moving their families, because of the
relatively small geographic area occupied by those countries.
In Canada and the United Kingdom, where reassignment may
involve a family move, real estate and legal fees and trans-
portation costs are fully reimbursed [16,17]. However, in
the United States,
Each year military people who are transferred must spend
over $1 billion out of their own pockets to accomplish
the move. The average cost to an E-7 with three depen-
dents to move himself and his family 1500 miles is
approximately $3,835. (This does not include the costs
of buying and selling a home or advance house hunting
trips.) Presently he is reimbursed only $644 by the
government and thus must come up with over $3000 to
defray the cost of a move which is undertaken for the
good of the service. This amount represents over 20
percent of his annual compensation [1:10].
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U.S. military personnel are extremely mohile, moving within
the nation as well as to overseas installations. Very
likely, a household move is involved when a U.S. servicemember
is transferred. Clearly, moves are expensive, even if the
example cited above overestimated the cost. This additional
expense cannot be discounted in comparing U.S. pay to nations
whose military personnel do not have the same problem,
b. Defense Attitudes
There is no military threat poised at the borders
of the United States and Canada. Certainly, U.S. and
Canadian forces are prepared to defend their homeland, but
they are mainly committed to do this indirectly through world-
wide defense commitments. It is possible that many service-
members perceive these global defense' commitments as "not
their problem." Likewise, since there is no direct threat
close to home, national defense may be considered outmoded.
In contrast military forces in Denmark, Norway, and the
Federal Republic of Germany are primarily concerned with
territorial defense. The United Kingdom and France are
expeditionary to a degree, but also have territorial concerns.
They all have a real military threat poised nearby. All
suffered the direct effects of World War II on their soil.




National image of the military may be a reten-
tion factor. None of the countries have suffered through
an involvement such as the United States did in Vietnam,
with the resultant negative image of the military forces.
The other nations are left with the positive attitude toward
their military forces from World War II as well as from non-
territorial involvement after World War II (Ireland, UN,
colonies , etc. )
.
B. CONCLUSION
This chapter has identified and briefly discussed some
of the complicating issues which can affect an international
comparison. None will be addressed directly in this paper,
but an awareness of them is important when comparing wages as




This chapter compares military wage rates of Canada,
Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway,
the United Kingdom, and the United States in three ways.
First, wages are compared in terms of absolute dollars;
second, as a ratio of military wages to the average gross
earnings of a typical worker in each respective country;
and third, as a ratio of military wages to the per capita
gross domestic product of each country. The latter two
methods allow relative comparison of the countries' wage
rates, reducing the distortions between countries created by
variations in cost of living and tax rates. Each mode is
subdivided into enlisted, regular officer, and officer pilot
categories. Despite the narrow scope of the study, full
comparability of the data has not been achieved. Some of
the reasons for this have been enumerated in the first two
chapters. Others are stated as assumptions and limitations
in this chapter, followed by sections on methodology, analysis,
and findings.
A. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS





The nonpecuniary factors of occupational choice such
as job stability, risk, separation, length of workday, job
satisfaction, and quality of recruits will not be considered.
Investment in training will also be ignored.
Direct compensation is analyzed; however, indirect
compensation and benefits are not considered. Wages available
for other nations are adjusted to resemble as closely as possi-
ble the typical U.S. military wage consisting of basic pay,
quarters, and subsistence allowances. With the exception of
flight pay in the officer pilot analysis, all other forms
of direct compensation are ignored. For purposes of computing
direct compensation, all ranks are considered to be married,
with two children.
2. Conscription
Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and
Norway all rely on conscripts and volunteers as sources of
manpower. The degree of conscription varies from near
universal in Norway and France to selective in Denmark and the
Federal Republic of Germany. A selective conscription system
is one which has liberal deferment and exemption policies or
where selection is done by lottery [15]. Conscript wages are
not analyzed since they are generally lower than volunteer
wages and not comparable to pay grades in the United States.
Denmark and Norway are excluded from the enlisted analysis
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because at the time of writing, little information was avail-
able to match enlisted (.volunteer) grades to comparable grades
in the United States. Therefore, only the enlisted pay
grades of France and the Federal Republic of Germany are in-
cluded, along with those of Canada, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. Since France relies so heavily on con-





It is recognized that income tax structures vary from
country to country. Also, some countries have a value-added
tax on goods and services. However, only before-tax wages
will be considered. Any tax advantage accrued because non-
taxable allowances are included in wages will not be considered.
These variations may cancel out when comparing military and
civilian wages within a nation; however, they will affect
international comparisons.
4 Exchange Rates
Foreign currency exchange rates in effect on
September 21, 1980, will be used [27].
5. The Data
The governments are quite keen on amassing statistics. They
collect them, add them, raise them to the nth power, take
the cube root, and prepare wonderful diagrams. But you must
never forget that every one of these figures comes in the
first instance from the village watchman, who just puts down







Wage and salary information obtained and used in
this study come from a wide variety of sources so that uni-
formity is most probably not achieved. In some instances
the data may have been "sanitized" or modified to reflect
the respective analyst's interpretation. It is also possi-
ble that for some countries all forms of direct compensation
were not provided. If so, for those countries, the military
wages may be understated.
The military wage and salary data used for all
computations is taken from 1980 pay scales. The U.S. data
includes the recent 11.7 percent pay raise received by all
military personnel. United Kingdom pay scales include three
recent significant pay raises. In 1979, two pay raises were
authorized, the first 24.2 percent, the second 9 percent. In
April 1980, the British Pay Review Revision Board authorized
another increase ranging from 14.5 to 20 percent [12].
Possible percentage pay increases for other nations are not
known
.
Pay grades of all nations are matched as closely as
possible to corresponding U.S. Army grades. For the purpose
of this study, career ranks will include pay grades E5 and
above (enlisted) and 02 and above (officers) . Pay grades and
corresponding U.S. Army ranks are shown in Table II. All





PAY GRADE AND RANK CONVERSION










E7 Sergeant First Class
E8 Master Sergeant














This study develops ratios of military earnings to
per capita gross domestic product and average gross earn-
ings per typical worker in each country. Data for each
category was obtained from the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development [28,29], Table III provides the
actual amounts, by country for each comparison base.
The average gross earnings per typical worker is
1973 data brought up to 1980 levels through the use of an
inflation index [30] . The typical worker is assumed to be
married, with two children, working in a manufacturing
industry [29]
.
The per capita gross domestic product is based on
1980 data. Since no adjustment was required, it may serve as
a more consistent measure across nations than average gross
earnings per typical worker. Review of Table III reveals the
lack of uniform proportionality between the two bases across
nations. This probably results from indexing the 1978 average
gross earnings per typical worker as well as from variations
in family size and the relative societal position of the
manufacturing worker from nation to nation. For example, in
France, average gross earnings per typical worker is 1.44
times per capita gross domestic product while in the United
Kingdom it is 2.52 times per capita gross domestic product.
The two comparison bases suffer from some of the


















CANADA $ 8,740 $15,286 1.75
DENMARK 10,950 21,625 1.97
FRANCE 8,850 12,701 1.44
FEDERAL
REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY 10,420 18,645 1.79
NORWAY 9,850 15,915 1.62
UNITED
KINGDOM 5,530 13,939 2.52
UNITED
STATES 9,660 15,446 1.60
Sources
:
Gross Domestic Product Ostry, Sylvia, "The World
Economy in the 1970s and 1980s",
OECD Observer, March 1980
Average Gross Earnings "1978 Tax Benefit of a Typical
Worker in OECD Member Countries ,
"
Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development, 1978.
(Phone conversation with OECD
Reference Librarian, Washington,
D.C., 12 November 1980).
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information. There is an absence of uniform, unambiguous




In this study, international military wages are compared
three ways. First, wages will be compared in terms of
absolute dollars; second, as a ratio of military wages to
the average gross earnings per typical worker in each
respective country; and third, as a ratio of military wages
to per capita gross domestic product of each country.
1. Absolute Dollar Analysis
A representative basic pay rate for each rank, by
country, was determined. The selection of the proper point
on each respective pay scale for comparison purposes posed
a bit of a problem. The U.S. pay scales are based on time
in service while the others are primarily based on time-in-
grade, or-rank. It was decided to select the midpoint of
time in grade for each rank in attempting to achieve a uniform
comparison. Department of Defense staff officers assisted
in providing a partial solution for making U.S. pay grades
comparable [31,32]. However, another complication surfaced.
The required time in service for promotion opportunities
varies significantly from one service to another, particularly
for enlisted personnel; i.e., the mid-point of time-in-rank
does not always represent the average time-in-rank for each
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country. The mid-point may be skewed to the right or left
of the average, possibly resulting in over- or understatement
of income in certain ranks and countries. For the United
States, Department of Defense promotion statistics are used
to determine the most representative comparison point for
enlisted personnel. Since no overall Department of Defense
promotion statistics were available for officers, Army
statistics are used to represent all services.
Canadian and French basic pay rates were reduced by
7.5 and 6 percent respectively, since those countries have
contributory retirement systems. A contributory retirement
system requires the member to give up a portion of his pay
as a contribution to his retirement plan. Denmark, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom,
and the United States have non-contributory retirement plans.
Failure to reduce Canadian and French wages would result
income being overstated.
Once the above adjustments were made, the appropriate
allowances were added to basic pay in order to approximate
the equivalent of U.S. basic pay plus quarters and subsistence
allowances. The result, when converted to U.S. dollars, repre-
sents the absolute wage for each rank, by country.
The absolute dollar analysis is probably best used
to compare wages between ranks within a particular nation.
Any attempt to compare absolute dollar amounts between nations
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without considering variations in inflation, purchasing power





An international comparison of the ratio of military
wages to average gross earnings per typical worker and to per
capita gross domestic product reduces the complications of
the absolute dollar analysis [33] . The ratios depict the
relative position of military personnel within each nation,
compared to the average typical manufacturing worker and to
per capita gross domestic product. For example, the distor-
tions resulting from international variations in inflation,
purchasing power, and tax structure are greatly reduced.
When the ratios are compared internationally, it is possible
to examine the relative position of the military in each
society and rank them accordingly.
To obtain the desired ratios for each country, the
absolute dollar wages for each rank were divided by the per
capita gross domestic product and by the average gross
earnings of a typical worker. An example of the computation
of the ratio of the wages of a French captain to per capita
gross domestic product follows.
PER CAPITA
ANNUAL PAY EXCHANGE ANNUAL PAY GDP,
FRANCS RATE U.S. DOLLARS FRANCE RATIO
74,172 -r 4.06 = $18,269 r $8,850 = 2.064
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C. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Subject to the limitations outlined in Chapter I and II
as well as to the assumptions and limitations listed in this
chapter, this section separately analyzes data for enlisted
personnel, regular officers, and officer pilots.
1. Enlisted Comparison
As mentioned, the enlisted comparison only includes
the countries of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
a. Absolute Dollars
Table IV and Figure 3 compare the enlisted pay
grades of each country in terms of absolute dollars. As
shown, the Federal Republic of Germany has the highest absolute
dollar pay at all pay grades up to E9, where it is overtaken
by the United States. The United States ranks approximately
second, except in pay grades E3, E4, E5, and E6 , where the
United Kingdom and Canada move ahead. This is interesting
because it is the departing mid-career E5s and E6s who are
causing the greatest enlisted retention problem in armed forces
of the United States. However, because of the distortions dis-
cussed earlier, these rankings should not be interpreted too
strictly.
b. Ratio of Enlisted Wages to the Average Gross
Earnings Per Typical Worker
The ratios of enlisted wages to the average gross
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Recall that the earnings base year is 1978, brought up to
1980 levels using inflation indexes. Analysis of these
ratios allows international comparison of each rank relative
to each nation's typical manufacturing worker. As expected,
this method yields somewhat different conclusions than the
absolute dollar method. The Federal Republic of Germany,
overall leader in absolute dollars, leads only grades E1-E3
here, slipping to fourth in grades E6-E9; the ratio reaching
1 at E7, one rank higher than for the United States.
The United States ranks third in grades E1-E3;
fourth in grades E4 and E5; second in grades E6 and E7; first
in grades E8 and E9 . The United States servicemember is
relatively worse off than most of his foreign counterparts,
in grades E1-E5; the years when a career decision or at least
the first reenlistment decision is likely to be made. The
United States is apparently not having a problem attracting
first term recruits, but it may be that the salary is not
sufficient to offset negative nonpecuniary factors at the
time of reenlistment. However, this comparison does not help
explain the retention problem in the more senior grades of
E6 and E7. Here the United States is second only to the
United Kingdom, yet apparently has a more severe retention
problem than its allies. It is possible that the higher
relative wage also here is insufficient to offset other fac-
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Average Gross Earnings Per Typical Worker
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c. Ratio of Enlisted Wages to Per Capita Gross
Domestic Product.
The ratio of enlisted wages to per capita gross
domestic product allows another means of relative comparison
between countries. While perhaps not as interesting as the
ratio to average gross earnings per typical worker, it may
be somewhat more reliable as an indicator since the base year
data is 1980 for all countries and no adjustment was required.
Table VI and Figure 5 present these comparisons and show that
except for France, the United States serviceman ranks below
his foreign counterpart, relatively speaking, in grades E3-
E7. The recent United Kingdom pay raises are shown clearly,
perhaps as indication of the effort required to overcome
a retention problem.
2 . Regular Officer Comparison
The regular officer comparison includes all seven
countries. Pilots are discussed in the subsequent section.
a. Absolute Dollars
Absolute dollar compensation is shown in Table VII
and plotted in Figure 6. The relative position of the U.S.
is quite consistent in the upper three grades, with the
United States third at 04 and second at 05 and 06. The lower
three grades are more inconsistent with the United States
ranking fourth at 01, second at 02, and first at 03. Since
grades 02, 03, and 04 (mid-careerists) appear to have the
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not provide any insight. The earlier caution on strict inter-
pretation of absolute data applies here as well.
b. Ratio of Regular Officer Wages to Average Gross
Income Per Typical Worker
Table VIII and Figure 7 show that except for pay
grades 01 and 05, the United States ranks above the other six
countries indicating that wages may not be the only signifi-
cant factor in the retention of U.S. regular officers. For
example, most U.S. officers have a regular undergraduate
degree and a high percentage have graduate degrees. This is
not generally true for the foreign officers included in this
study. European officers are educated through the military
system which frequently does not compare directly with a
civilian degree. Since U.S. officers receive more training
and education that is easily transferable to civilian sector
occupations than their foreign counterparts, it is possible
that they also have relatively better opportunities in the
civilian sector.
c. Ratio of Regular Officer Pay to Per Capita
Gross Domestic Product
Table IX and Figure 8 present the information.
Except for the United Kingdom, U.S. regular officers rank
relatively higher than their counterparts in relation to per
capita gross domestic product. Because U.S. officers appear
to be well compensated compared to others, yet have a reten-
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Fig. 3—Ratio of Regular Officer Pay To
Per Caoita Gross Domestic Product

factors in occupational choice or in international differences
in civilian sector opportunities.
3. Pilot's Comparison
Except for the extra amount paid for the additional
training and risk, pilot's compensation in all countries is
the same as regular officer compensation. Denmark and
Norway are not included because no flight pay data was
available. Absolute dollar data, average gross income per
typical worker ratios, and per capita gross domestic product
ratios are presented and graphed in Tables X, XI, and XII
and Figures 9, 10, and 11, showing that United States'
pilots fare as well as the regular officer category when
compared to other nations. That is, except for British pilots,
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Fig. 9—Officer Pilot Pay In Absolute Dollars
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Throughout this study, it has been emphasized that the
analysis focused on just one aspect of United States mid-
career military retention problem: direct compensation.
Many other factors must be considered, including indirect
pay, fringe benefits, risk, stability, etc. These other deter-
minants must be kept in mind in studying the conclusions, as
they were throughout this study.
A. ENLISTED PERSONNEL
The analysis indicates the United States enlisted personnel
may be worse off, relatively speaking, than their foreign
counterparts in pay grades El to E7. This range includes the
mid-career noncommissioned officers and petty officers (E5 to
E7) who are departing the service today and who constitute part
of the problem this thesis set out to investigate. Although
the United States is not presently having a problem enlisting
enough first-term personnel to fill grades E1-E4, these are
the people who later reenlist and become careerists. Thus,
their relatively lower pay could be a factor behind the attri-
tion. The study does indicate, however, that the United States'
noncommissioned officers and petty officers are being compensated
relatively and absolutely less than their foreign counterparts;
relatively less meaning compared to the average manufacturing
worker and to per capita gross domestic product.
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B. REGULAR OFFICERS AND PILOTS
Regular officers and pilots fare well when wages are
compared to their counterparts in other countries. Only
officers in the United Kingdom appear to be as well or better
compensated, relatively speaking. However, consideration
must be given to the significant pay raises received by
British forces during 1979-80. This conclusion is made in
the sense that U. S. military compensation, though fairly
generous compared to other nations with smaller retention
problems, may still be insufficient to offset the possibly
greater disutility associated with military service in the
United States or possibly greater civilian sector opportunities
for U. S. Officers. For example, the U. S. military may be
reassigned to new locations more frequently than foreign
counterparts, and such moves also involve the household. This
is costly not only in terms of dollars, but also in terms of
personal and family considerations. In addition, because U. S.
officers tend to be educated in institutions which confer
civilian bachelor's and master's degrees, officers are aware
of private section opportunities and the demand for their
skills. Consequently, a U. S. officer may have greater job
mobility than his foreign counterpart. Unless the possibly
greater disutility associated with military service is offset
by higher compensation, a resignation may result.
The discussion above is supported by a recent U. S. Air




Pilots said pay increases were too small, they had little
say in future assignments , future assignments were un-
satisfactory, civilian jobs had more geographic stability,
and civilian jobs held more job satisfaction.
Navigators surveyed gave their top five reasons for
leaving as little say in future assignments, promotion
opportunity, unsatisfactory future assignments, less
family separation in civilian jobs, and more independence
in decision-making in civilian jobs.
For non-rated officers, the top five reasons were more
satisfaction in civilian jobs, more geographic stability
in civilian jobs, non-airline civilian job opportunities,
higher pay in civilian jobs, and more independence in
decision-making in civilian jobs [40:15].
These general survey results of departing officers indicate
that the other determinants of occupational choice are
significant to their decision to leave the Air Force and
are not sufficiently offset by direct compensation. By
extension, these conclusions may also hold in the Army and
the Navy.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The idea that monetary compensation is not the only
determinant of occupational choice has been stressed through-
out this study. In addition to pay/compensation, the study
of nations other than the United States revealed other inter-
related determinants which may be worth examining as possible
policies for reducing the retention problem.
Figures 1 and 2 in Chapter I demonstrated that in addition
to pay, other policies affect retention. Figure 1 illustrates
that the slope (or the elasticity) of the supply curve deter-
mines what it costs to increase retention, using pay only.
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However, Figure 2 illustrates, pay remining constant, how
other factors can shift the supply curve and increase or de-
crease retention. Thus, it may be worthwhile to examine
policies observed elsewhere which do not involve direct compen-
sation. It is possible that such policies might be more cost
effective in improving U. S. retention rates than increasing
direct pay. Some of the alternative policies identified in
this study which may be worthy of evaluation are listed below.
1. "X" Factor
Canada, the United Kingdom, and Norway recognize the
greater (perceived) disutility of military service by com-
pensating for it directly as opposed to indirect methods in
the United States. The question is to which degree will formal




Less Strict Military Discipline
Permission to have longer hair and "gentling" the system
may help initial recruitment but may not affect reenlistment.
If both recruiting and retention were improved, however, the
gains may be offset by reduced military effectiveness.
3 Overtime
Extra payments for extra hours worked may have merit.
Extra leisure time in lieu of overtime pay might also be
considered. However, this policy increases cost per effective
manhour
.
4 Reduce Number of and Cost of Moves
Study of the reassignment policies of other countries may
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provide ideas for reducing the number of moves a U. S. military
family must take. Adoption of the British-style regimental
system in the United States may not only enhance unit cohesion,
but also improve retention through greater stability [41] . For
required moves, full reimbursement of all moving expenses includ-
ing pre-and post-move motel accommodations, real estate and
attorney fees on the sale of property, travel, and the cost




Allowing negotiation for pay through a wage system that
rewards special qualifications as observed, for example, in
Scandinavia may also help retention.
6 Officer Education
Explicit acceptance of U. S. officer education as possibly
being more easily transferable to the civilian sector and
taking corrective or compensatory action, may also improve
retention.
7 Retirement Policy
Retirement policies of other nations vary greatly and many
have unique features which may enhance retention. Further study
may indicate that some of these features would be adoptable to
the U. S. system.
All of the above policies can shift the retention supply
curve. None are costless and therefore, their cost-effectiveness




A valid international comparison of military compensation,
even one of such narrow scope as this one, requires much
effort, time, and expense. Ideally, each country should be
visited and the pay information, qualified by explanation,
should be obtained directly from the appropriate defense
agencies or representatives. Staff officers involved with
compensation should review calculations for each country to
ensure that all components of direct compensation are included.
Additional bases for relative comparison are required. Per
capita gross domestic product and the average gross income
per typical worker are insufficient for examining the rela-
tive positions in society held by enlisted personnel and
officers. Comparing military wages to those of respective
civilian counterparts like doctors, lawyers, civil servants,
mechanics, etc. would be more meaningful.
In summary, this thesis investigated the problem of
retaining mid-career officers, noncommissioned officers
and petty officers in the U. S. military. The analysis
indicated that United States' noncommissioned officers and
petty officers are being compensated relatively and abso-
lutely less than their foreign counterparts but that this
does not hold for United States' officers. This may imply
that the enlisted retention problem results at least in part
from insufficient compensation. However, the study also
indicates that monetary compensation is not the only determinant
affecting retention. The United States' greater retention
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problems may be due to other occupational choice factors
interrelated with compensation, i.e., it is possible that
current U. S. compensation levels may be insufficient to
offset the relatively greater perceived disutility associated
with U. S. military service, or U. S. military personnel may
have greater opportunities in the civilian sector than their
foreign counterparts. Several policies other than compensation
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